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ECONOMIC PLANNING-A SELF- 
DESTRUCTIVE MECHANISM?* 
HERE are two possibIe results of the present world 
crisis, neither of which is peace as we knew it between 
the first two world wars of this century: (1) the Korean War 
will be isolated and will not spread; or (2) there will be a 
third world war. If the Korean War does not spread, there is 
little hope that we can live in peace-that we can be free 
from fear. We must assume that we shall be continuously sub- 
ject to sporadic outbursts of Communist aggression & the 
furtherance of Russia's imperialistic designs, which clearly 
have world domination as their goal. We must be prepared at 
any and all times to meet and stop Communist aggression 
where it may occur. Even if there is a general war, an occur- 
rence which events of the last two weeks have shown to be, 
if not probable, at least possible, there is every reason to 
believe that the struggle will drag on for decades. In either 
event, we cannot hope for more than life in a "garrison 
economy" for generations to come-a situation without prece- 
dent in the history of this country. 
A protracted armament program means greatly increased 
demand by government for the product of our economy, 
which is already operating at full capacity to supply civilian 
needs. Without economic controls, the competition for scarce 
resources between government and civilians can only mean 
upward-spiraling prices. Since this competition will continue 
for the foreseeable future, inflation will be a permanent threat 
to the economy. The institution of economic controls de- 
signed to counteract this persistent tendency toward inflation 
" A public lecture delivered at the Rice Institute on October 22, 
1950. 
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is imminent. Since controls of a permanent danger may well 
become permanent themselves, it is doubly necessary that 
we examine the dangers to freedom inherent in such controls. 
Economic planning, of course, is not a new phenomenon. 
Since the 19307s, there has been great pressure for control of 
our free enterprise system especially for the prevention of 
depressions. 
Eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism stressed the 
benefits of free private enterprise and the deleterious effects 
of governmental controls. These concepts were embodied in 
various laissex faire theories which assumed a harmony be- 
tween private interests and the general welfare. In the United 
States these theories were reflected in a Constitution which 
provided for limited government, federalism, and a system of 
checks and balances. I t  was to be the limited role of the fed- 
eral government to provide for the national defense, to  pro- 
tect property, to insure the sanctity of contracts, to assure 
free commerce between the states, and to maintain a na- 
tional monetary system. Government was thereby divested of 
responsibility for economic organization and the individual 
was left free to satisfy his material needs without interference 
from the state. 
The complex nature of productive processes and the obvi- 
ous advantages of the division of labor led to the develop- 
ment of a system of private business which was in reality a 
system of private government that voluntarily assumed re- 
sponsibility for and control of the system of economic or- 
ganization. This system may be designated as capitalism, free 
enterprise, or hissex faire. 
The fundamental institutional features of capitalism are as 
f01lows:~ 
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1. Private ownership and control of the means of produc- 
tion. 
2. A free working class divorced from the ownership of the 
instruments of production. 
3. The use of a wage system whereby free workers sell 
their services in return for a money wage based on pro- 
ductive effort, rather than upon some ethical concept 
such as need. 
4. The use of a credit and monetary system. 
5. A commercial agriculture to provide for the needs of an 
urban population which is not self-sufficient. 
6. A stable government to protect property rights and to 
facilitate the workings of the system. 
The successful operation of any system requires decisions 
wit11 respect to the alIocation of resources to competing uses. 
Furthermore, there must be a method of coordination and 
incentives for initiative and the assumption of responsibility. 
In a capitalist ox free enterprise system, these requirements 
are met by:2 
1. Maximum dependence upon competition and free play 
of prices to determine who shall produce what. 
2. Maximum dependence upon profit rather than compul- 
sion as an incentive. 
3. Maximum emphasis on free personal choice among eco- 
nomic opportunities. 
Historically, there have been certain restrictions imposed 
upon free enterprise in response to social pressures. As a 
result, it is not and has never been a system of complete 
laissex faire. Today it is widely accepted that: 
1. Free enterprise is not the freedom to make profit by any 
and all means. 
2. Free enterprise is not the freedom to profit at the ex- 
pense of the public welfare. 
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3. Free enterprise is not the freedom to exploit other men. 
4. Free enterprise is not the freedom to monopolize. 
5. Free enterprise is not the freedom to waste natural re- 
sources. 
6. Free enterprise is not opposition to necessary and ap- 
propriate government regulation or operation-often 
for no other reason than that it is governmental. 
7. Free enterprise is not the appeal to government for 
subsidy or protection when adversity appears. 
There are other possible forms of economic and social or- 
ganization which preceded and/or have been contemporary 
with capitalism. For purposes of the subsequent analysis, it 
is necessary to consider briefly the major alternative systems: 
socialism, communism, and fascism. The economic char- 
acteristic distinguishing socialism and communism from 
capitalism is that the means of production are owned col- 
lectively rather than privately. Under fascism, while the 
means of production may be privately owned, their use is 
directed by the state for its own purposes; however, the 
state is generally considered to be controlled by or conscious 
of the interests of "Big Business." The basic difference be- 
tween communism and socialism is not economic but a 
matter of political technique. 
I t  is well to recognize at  the beginning of our analysis that 
the study of economic processes cannot be isolated from other 
social phenomena. Indeed, it may be said that there is but 
one great Science of Sociology (or political economy as some 
would call it) in which the economist must join with the his- 
torian, the psychologist, the philosopher, the legal theorist, 
the anthropologist, and others in the search for social laws. 
The departmentalization of our knowledge and efforts may 
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~artially account for our ineptness in the analysis of social 
~roblems. Nevertheless, specialization is necessaiy because of 
the magnitude of social problems. I t  is only natural that I 
should emphasize the economic aspects of our subject and 
rely most heavily upon the technical methods of economics 
in the subsequent analysis. 
Economics, broadly defined, is an "inquiry into the nature 
and causes of the wealth (and poverty) of nations." Wealth 
consists of all material products which were not furnished 
by nature in unlimited abundance but which are necessary, 
useful, and agreeable to man.3 The creation of wealth is re- 
stricted by the physical limits of a nation's resources, both 
natural and human, and the rate at which they may be ex- 
ploited in accordance with given technological knowledge. 
When a nation is exploiting its resources at the optimum 
physical and technological rate, it is said to be at "full em- 
ployment." When a society's economic system fails to reach 
full employment, it exposes some members of that society to 
physical want and suffering. I t  exposes the society itself to 
pressures from these members-pressures for political and 
economic change. If an economy cannot supply work for all 
members of the society, when work is necessary to obtain the 
monetary means whereby goods and services necessary for 
life can be bought, then it is not unreasonable to expect poli- 
tical pressure from those who are forced to do without. Such 
pressure is directed toward a change in the system, or of the 
system, in order to increase the national product and to pro- 
vide these dispossessed groups or individuals with what they 
consider to be their rightful share. 
If we measure a society's economic effort in terms of the 
monetary value of its production within a given period, then 
the national product or national income consists of private 
household expenditures on consumption goods, plus private 
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business expenditures on producers goods, plus government 
expenditures for the products of private firms or for labor 
which is used to produce government services. The level of 
employment of resources is determined by the sum of the 
expenditures by these three sectors of the economy. 
Free enterprise systems have characteristically been sub- 
ject to recurrent periods of depression or deflation. In such 
periods the total expenditures by the sectors fall short of the 
level necessary to support full employment. Furthermore, 
capitalist economies have occasionally faced temporary infla- 
tionary periods in which the sum of the expenditures of the 
three sectors rises above the full employment level with 
resultant price spirals. Alternating periods of prosperity and 
depression are generally accepted as inescapable characteris- 
tics of so-called unplanned free enterprise systems. 
In addition to the grave dangers posed by inflationary and 
deflationary conditions, it has been asserted that our capitalist 
economy was threatened in the 1930's by a new peril. This 
was the threat of permanent equilibrium at less than full 
employment. Many believed that "secular stagnation" had 
set in, that the economy had become permanently unable 
fully to employ its labor force. 
These then are the origins of the political pressures for 
changes in or of our capitalistic system. 
Some advocated the substitution of other economic sys- 
tems on the grounds that (I) free enterprise could never 
achieve and maintain full employment of resources, or (2) 
that even if full employment could be achieved, free enter- 
prise would be a less efficient form of industrial organization 
than the particular system which they advocated. 
Others contended that free enterprise should accept such 
control devices, such "planning," as might be necessary to 
meet the goal of full employment. These were persons who 
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defended free enterprise as the best form of economic organ- 
ization in spite of its admitted inability to maintain full em- 
ployment at all times, and in spite of the possibility that it 
might never again achieve full employment. Some would claim 
that this group also included those who advocated other sys- 
tems, but believed that a gradual modification of free enter- 
prise was an easier way (politically and economically) to attain 
these systems than to seek immediate, total socialization of 
the economy. 
But the pressure for the introduction of controls for the 
purpose of saving free enterprise met opposition, largely from 
those who appear to be the most vigorous supporters of this 
particular type of economic system. Why? First, they may 
have believed that any control by definition eliminates the free 
enterprise system, that "free enterprise" and "control" are 
mutually incompatible terms. A corollary of this belief is 
that such widespread suffering as that which occurred in the 
1930's was unusual and would not recur. Depressions might 
again occur but would not be so severe as to create danger of 
political upheaval. In any event, control would mean the end 
of free enterprise and there was nothing to lose by hoping 
that future economic dislocations would not be fatal. 
Second, they may have believed that abandoning the free 
enterprise system in toto would mean the eventual loss of 
something more important than economic freedom, namely, 
personal freedom. If personal freedom depends upon the 
existence of the free enterprise system, then the loss of that 
system entails the loss of something for which there is no rec- 
ompense, not even the elimination of recurrent periods of 
material want. 
The combination of these two views is the most restrictive. 
If one believes that any economic control means the end of 
free enterprise and that the end of free enterprise means the 
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end of personal liberty, then there could indeed be no choice 
between the possible loss of personal liberty from failure to 
institute so-called "corrective controls" and the certain loss 
of personal liberty from the institution of such controls. 
This was the great economic dilemma of our time. If we 
did not control the free enterprise economy, we subjected 
ourselves to recurrent periods of economic depression and the 
risk of political subversion of our society. If we attempted to 
control, we risked the loss of the free enterprise system, since 
it may be that any control is incompatible with free enter- 
prise. Further we risked the loss of personal political freedom, 
since this may depend on the existence of economic freedom. 
Controls designed to avoid serfdom might eventually lead to 
serfdom. 
& & 0 
Until five months ago, this dilemma was nurtured by the 
specter of recurrent or persistent unempIoyment. Since the 
outbreak of the Korean War, a new and potentially more 
serious danger faces us. Today, and for the foreseeable fu- 
ture, depressions are of remote concern. The specter today 
is that of perpetual, persistent, cumulative inflation. 
Economically, the danger arises from the fact that a society 
experiencing galloping inflation has great difficulty in dis- 
tributing its product. In depressions, we do not produce 
enough for all. In inflations, equal economic hardship for 
many groups or individuals can arise from their inability to 
obtain a sufficient share in the national product, which may 
be at a physical maximum. Even though the economy pro- 
duces at the maximum physical rate, those groups whose in- 
comes lag behind the rise of prices in inflationary spirals 
s d e r  hardships. Their attempts to correct this situation by 
demanding higher wages and salaries only serve to intensify 
the inflation, causing new demands for higher pay. One thinks 
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of a dog chasing his tad, where the head is marked prices 
and the tail wages, or vice versa. 
The political pressures resulting from the rising cost of liv- 
ing in 1947-1948 are well known to all of us. What is the poli- 
tical potential of such pressures if the cost of living should 
continue to rise for the foreseeable future at an ever increas- 
ing rate? If anyone doubts the force of political unrest that 
is carried in galloping inflations, let him look back only as far 
as Austria and Germany in the early 1920's. 
Today, idation is even more dangerous to our society 
than it would be in time of true peace. Why? The basic cause 
of this inflation is rearmament. Military and civilian needs 
compete for the products of an economy operating at full 
capacity. There is a high degree of unanimity that reanna- 
ment is necessary if we are to preserve any peace and save 
the Western world from Russian imperialism. But when de- 
pressions were the threat there was a widespread opposition 
to the introduction of controls. 
The key to the former problem of maintaining full em- 
ployment was governmental fiscal policy. By this we mean 
the attempt of the federal government to maintain high 
levels of national income approaching full employment by the 
use of certain devices of fiscal and monetary policy which 
operate on the national income aggregatively. Such devices 
are variations in tax yields and government expenditures 
over time. Tax yields are increased as national income rises 
toward full employment in order to avoid Mation. Con- 
versely, they are decreased as national income declines in 
times of depression, to provide additional funds for con- 
sumers and businessmen with which they may buy and invest 
in order to offset any tendencies toward such catastrophes 
as the depression of the 1930's. The most direct evidence of 
such policies is a theoretical government budgetary deficit 
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in times of depressions and a government budgetary surplus 
in times of booms. In addition, there are certain powers over 
the availability of credit which are exercised by the Federal 
Reserve System, e.g., making interest rates lower in depres- 
sions to encourage borrowing and higher in booms to dis- 
courage inflationary investments, restricting consumer and 
stock and commodity market credits in booms, etc. 
To a certain extent, fiscal policy measures operate auto- 
matically in the desired direction as national income rises or 
falls. When incomes rise sharply, income tax yields automati- 
cally rise, even though the tax rate is fixed, and siphon off 
inflationary purchasing power. When incomes fall in depres- 
sions, income tax yields fall, leaving a larger proportion of 
received income for consumers and businessmen to spend. 
Similarly, the amount of money disbursed for government un- 
employment insurance rises in depressions when consunler 
purchasing power is low and falls in booms when consumers 
are employed. 
There is a debate between economists as to whether this 
"built-in flexibility" is enough to preserve full employment 
and prevent inflation. Many would argue that it is not, con- 
tending that in galloping inflation, tax rates should be raised. 
In deep depression, they should be cut sharply; public works 
should be instituted in order to feed purchasing power into 
the hands of consumers and cause businessmen to invest in 
inventories and employ workers in order to fill government 
contracts for these public works. In short, discretwna?~ meas- 
ures would be necessary to avoid galloping inflation or crash- 
ing depressions. 
I t  will be noted that the essential characteristic of all these 
measures of control over the economy of which we have 
spoken in regard to the pre-Korean situation are aggregative 
controls. This is opposed to what we may call particular con- 
Economic Planning 11 
trols, i.e., regulation of individual businesses directly by the 
government. Nearly all economists agree as to the advisa- 
bility of built-in fiscal policy measures. I t  is probably safe to 
say that most economists believe that some discretionary ac- 
tion is inevitable in extraordinary periods of decline or rise 
of national income, e.g., 1930 and 1948. But few American 
economists believe in the minute control of all businesses by 
government. Those who do are planners for the sake of 
planning. At the very least they are close to being Socialists. 
We have of course had some of what we might call perma- 
nent, direct regulation of enterprise in this country. The 
Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act-these limit the 
actions of businessmen severely. Even more direct regulation 
is that which we have long ago accepted-the regulation of 
certain industries which we call "public utilities" because of 
the essentially public nature of their services. 
In recent years the President's Council of Economic Ad- 
visers has gone even further in asking Congress to grant the 
federal govelmment power to create additional capacity in 
such industries as steel, where government planners do not 
feel that there is enough capacity for the natural growth of 
the economy. 
The direct controls which may be necessary to fight per- 
sistent inflation, however, are far more stringent than mere 
anti-monopoly legislation. In times of national emergency 
with full employment of resources, it is necessary to allocate 
the limited output of certain goods for which both civilians 
and the military compete. Such allocation requires direct in- 
terference in the conduct of individual enterprises, not merely 
general controls over the whole economy under which busi- 
nessmen are left relatively free to make decisions. Recall 
the economic controls of the second World War. Now the gov- 
ernment again has the power to institute price controls, quan- 
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tity (i.e., priority) controls, credit controls, and rationing. 
When government regulates prices which the individual busi- 
nessman may charge, when it limits the quantities of certain 
materials he may buy and the quantity he may sell, indeed, 
when it tells him how much to produce-then government 
has taken from the businessman much or all of his power 
to make economic decisions, When it does, capitalism as a 
method of economic organization is seriously menaced. In the 
last war controls were temporary and private capitalism 
was reinstated afterward. Today the threat is persistent in- 
flation. The controls may be permanent. There may be no 
"after" period. 
* * 0 
What is the effect of the introduction of controls in a free 
enterprise economy? There are three lines of opinion ex- 
pressed in the economic literature. These are exemplified by 
the works of Karl  mar^,^ Joseph Schumpeter (late Professor 
of Economics at Harvard Uni~ersity),~ and Friedrich Hayek 
(Professor of Economics, London School of Economics).' 
Marx of course was actually not concerned with the effects 
of economic controls per se, but his familiar economic de- 
terminism would deny that such controls drive us along 
the road to socialism. Such a process is inevitable. Indeed, a 
literal application of his economic interpretation of history 
would indicate that both the Hayek school and those who 
say that free enterprise can be saved by some control are 
wrong. The process of accumulation of capital by the aggres- 
sive capitalist leads to a polarization of society into bourgeois 
and proletariat, into %haves" and '8ave-nots." Such a polariza- 
tion is inevitable. As time passes, more and more people will 
fall into the "have-not" group from the "semi-have" group, 
i.e., the middle class. This class will cease to exist. The haves 
will continue to have progressively more. The have-nots will 
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continue to have progressively less. In  the end, privation 
will drive the far more numerous have-nots to rise up and 
overthrow the haves by violent means. Capitalism has in- 
evitably sown the seeds of its own destruction. 
But history has shown that, at least to date, Marx has been 
wrong. His great error has been in not anticipating the fact 
that both haves and have-nots could increase their standard 
of living. This has been possible for two reasons: (1) the 
capitalist, free enterprise economy has been so successful 
in its recurrent boom years in the creation of wealth, that 
there has been sufficient wealth to permit rapid and sub- 
stantial increases in mass standards of living; (2) Marx failed 
to give the defenders of capitalism credit for second sight. 
He committed an error fatal to so many military operations, 
for indeed world revolution might be called that. He under- 
estimated the enemy. We may use an analogy from the eco- 
nomic theory of competition among the few. The rational 
entrepreneur who operates in a market where he faces only 
a few competitors must engage in what we call "conjectural 
variation." When planning a price cut, an advertising cam- 
paign, etc., he must first consider what his competitors think 
he thinks they think he is going to do. 
Marx failed to consider that the defenders of free enter- 
prise would consider the effects of his theories upon the pro- 
letariat, and the possible reactions of the capitalists. Indeed, 
a cynic might say that Marx ruined his own cause. Perhaps 
the capitalists would not have recognized the danger. The 
furor caused by Das Kapital and the Communist Manifesto 
was sufficient to arouse at least a few. Hence, the capitalist- 
defending politician institutes such things as social legisla- 
tion and fiscal policy to help free the proletariat from want. 
Economic determinism is defeated by conscious measures 
designed to remove the potential causes of social upheaval. 
Q V- Lr 
The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
Professor Schumpeter would say that while "Marx was 
wrong in his diagnosis of the manner in which capitalist 
society would break down; he was not wrong in the predic- 
tion that it would break down e~entually."~ 
According to Schumpeter, the capitalist order tends to 
destroy itself for four basic reasons which may be sum- 
marized as follows: 
(1) The very success of the capitalist class in developing the 
productive powers of this country has somewhat obviated the 
necessity for its existence, making its replacement by a 
bureaucracy easier. Economic progress tends to become de- 
personalized and automatized. The very fact that this success 
has created a new standard of life for all classes has under- 
mined the social position of the business class. 
( 2 )  The capitalist system is based on the maximization by 
every individual of "his own (short run) utilitarian ends." 
Where this is true, there is a tendency to the destruction of 
loyalties of subordinates toward the leaders of production. 
These loyalties are necessary for the maintenance of efficient 
leadership and a leading capitalist class. 
(3) The capitalist system, while it has created prosperity 
which has overflowed to the petty bourgeoisie, has at the same 
time antagonized these groups by its successful achievement 
of bigness. These groups have prospered under the umbrella 
of capitalist development, but this prosperity has permitted 
the growth of a class which does not have the interests of large- 
scale business at heart and constitutes a potential opposition 
to capitalism. Similarly, an intellectua1 opposition has pros- 
pered. The very increase of the standard of living which capi- 
talism has engendered enables these opposition classes more 
effectively to oppose. 
(4) The scheme of values of a capitalist society, principally 
private profit and individual property rights, decreases in im- 
portance as capitalism succeeds in creating ever larger, legal- 
istic, impersonal business units. The stockholder of the Ameri- 
can Telephone and Telegraph Company feels little driving, 
personal interest in the conduct of "his" enterprise; indeed, 
he has no effective say in its conduct. Security and equality- 
these are more and more becoming the dominant economic 
motives. 
Economic Planning 15 
Schumpeter emphasizes the distance we have traveled 
from Iaissez faire capitalism. He is of those who would call 
any control a departure from free enterprise: fiscal policy to 
prevent depression; anti-monopoly regulation; labor market 
regulation; money market regulation; extension of the range 
of wants satisfied by governmental effort. All these are com- 
mon today and widely accepted. By definition they are de- 
partures from free enterprise. As they are extended, the de- 
parture from free enterprise will be accentuated. 
Schumpeter has always stressed that he speaks of long-run 
tendencies. He admits, however, that while mere events 
(such as total wars!) cannot change these deterministic tend- 
encies, they can create situations which let them accelerate. 
An example of such a situation is inflation. Such controls 
as are necessary to meet the threat of persistent inflation can 
only speed us along the predetermined road from laissex faire 
to socialism. I t  is possible that the evolution might stop some- 
where short of complete socialism, perl~aps with freedom of 
economic activity still remaining to farmers, retailers, and 
small producers-but this is not capitalism. 
0 0 n 
Marx and Schumpeter would have us believe that capital- 
ism contains the seeds of its own destruction, that the more 
efficiently it  operates, the more efficiently and surely it will 
destroy itself. 
Professor Hayek, a defender of the capitalist economic sys- 
tem, disputes this position violently. He cannot accept the 
economic determinism of Marx and Schumpeter. We are 
not inevitably led anywhere that we do not want to go. If 
we restrict free enterprise, then we doom ourselves to serf- 
dom. But there is no reason why we cannot by appropriate 
political action reverse the trend toward socialism and return 
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to free enterprise in those countries where it has been left 
behind. I t  is not the capitalist system per se which will 
destroy us, but the economic planning which interferes with 
its operation. Further, according to Professor Hayek it is not 
even planning as such that we must fear, but the wrong kind 
of planning. He asserts that the term "planning" has un- 
fortunately acquired unpleasant overtones. Economic plan- 
ning by someone is necessary in any system, be it capitalist, 
socialist, or communist. It is a question of who does the 
planning. In a free enterprise economy it is individual busi- 
nessmen who plan. In a socialist economy, the planning is 
done by one central authority. What we have to fear is the 
usurpation of decision-making by central government. Fur- 
ther, some planning by central government is permissible, 
and even necessary, for the free enterprise system to work. 
This kind of planning must be planning for competition, not 
planning against it. The former will help us maintain and im- 
prove the workings of the free enterprise system. The latter 
will lead us to serfdom. Centralized planning which is not for 
competition is only permissible, in general, where competition 
cannot be made effective by the proper legal framework. 
In other words, necessary planning is all right. Unneces- 
sary planning is not. The skeptic immediately must ask: 
"Where do we draw the line?" To a large extent, Professor 
Hayek dodges this problem. There is little doubt that the 
type of planning we face in a war economy, namely, direct 
control of prices, raw materiaIs, etc., is of the "unnecessary" 
type. But what of aggregative income control, the device we 
have used in the past to assure full employment? Professor 
Hayek seems to ignore this point-as do other British writers. 
To them it is socialism in toto which is the danger-not 
merely fiscal policy. 
Professor Hayek does commit himself on these points: 
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(1) Government must not attempt price or quantity regula- 
tion-here the "system is no longer free and does not provide a 
guide to business actions." 
(2) Prescribing conditions of production for all producers is 
permissible. (This might mean that regulation of the level of 
income would be permissible, since all producers wouId be 
equally affected with a minimum of interference with private 
decision making.) 
(3) Social services that do not render competition ineffective 
over wide fields are permissible. 
(4) Government may provide a monetary system, market 
regulation, and business information. 
(5 )  Government may set up a legal structure sufficient to let 
competition work. 
If planning exceeds these limits of "for competition," then 
competition ceases to operate as an effective guide to pro- 
duction. A mixture of competition and controls 'means that 
neither will really work and the result will be worse than if 
either system had been consistently relied upon." Why? For 
competition to work, we must have a free price system. When 
we do, we have the best economic system. When we do not, 
competition is ineffective. Similarly, half-hearted planning 
- 
is worthless. Once we abandon competition for semi-plan- 
ning, we must go all the way to achieve an efficient allocation 
of resources and production of wealth. Once we limit com- 
petition, we must surrender our economic liberty to achieve 
an efficient production of wealth. 
Before proceeding further with Professor Hayek's thesis, 
i t  is necessary to pause and examine its economic implica- 
tions. 
The capitalism of Schumpeter is characterized by innovat- 
ing capitalists, e.g., Andrew Carnegie, whose goal is the ac- 
cumulation of large quantities of capital and the making of 
profits. Indeed, success of the capitalist system is shown in 
such giant enterprises as the Carnegie steel works. But Hayek 
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has a different concept of free enterprise or capitalism. Re- 
member that Schumpeter specifically listed anti-monopoly 
regulation as a departure from free enterprise. But under 
Hayek's system such legislation would be a mandatory part 
of that planning necessary to make competition work. To 
Professor Hayek competition is the essence of a free enter- 
prise system, Competition is the best economic system for 
two reasons: (1) it is the most efficient method of controlling 
economic activities; (2) it is the only one not requiring coer- 
cive or arbitrary authority. But this latter reason is obviously 
inconsistent, since he himself admits the necessity for setting 
up a legal framework in which competition can work. En- 
forcement of laws requires coercion. Anti-monopoly regula- 
tion is an example. He admits that monopoly exists; conse- 
quently action must be taken against it for competition to 
work. Bigness in business becomes an evil equal almost to 
socialism. Bigness, indeed, is the evil he attacks, be it private 
bigness or public bigness. 
As for the first reason: Why is competition the most effi- 
cient way of controlling economic activities? Because the price 
system working freely supplies the information which per- 
mits each individual businessman to make his decisions on 
how much labor and capital to employ for what output. 
Decisions must be made on the individual firm basis for the 
simple reason that the complexities of economic life have be- 
come so great as to defy economy-wide regulation of the in- 
dustrial system. No board or agency can possibly have the 
necessary information or brainpower to cope with the many 
variables which must be considered when, say, changing a 
price. The central pillar on which his claim for competition 
stands is a freely working price mechanism. 
In Hayek's words: 
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"Because all the details of the changes constantly affecting the 
conditions of demand and supply of the different commodi- 
ties can never be fully known, or enough be collected 
and disseminated, by any one center, what is required is some 
apparatus of registration which automatically records all the 
relevant effects of individual actions and whose indications 
are at the same time the resultant of, and the guide for, all 
the individual decisions. This is precisely what the price sys- 
tem does under competition and which no other system even 
promises to accomplish. It  enables entrepreneurs, by watch- 
ing the movement of comparatively few prices , . . to adjust 
their activities to those of their fellows. The important point 
here is that the price system will fuEl this function only if 
competition prevails, that is, if the individual producer has 
to adapt himself to price changes and cannot control them."* 
To how many producers in our present-day economy does 
this apply? How many producers cannot influence the price 
of their products? Pure competition in this theoretical sense 
necessitates the following condition: every producer must 
have an output so small in relation to the total market for 
his product that if his production were completely eliminated 
there would be no price change. I submit that there are 
practically no industries in the American economy today 
where this is true, outside of agriculture. If all production of 
Fords stopped, what would happen to automobile prices? 
Cannot the Ford Motor Company vary its own car prices? 
The economic system Hayek envisages is one from a dream 
world that has not existed in this country since we began 
to evolve from an agricultural into an industrial nation. To 
attain it, to make this kind of competition work as the best 
economic system, would necessitate a complete revamping 
of our economic system, would necessitate an application 
of arbitrary authority by the side of which socialism would 
be indeed a mild form of revolution. Literally interpreted, 
his thesis calls for the dismemberment of every producing 
business which is large enough to be able to influence the 
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price of its product, which means practically every business. 
In  the first place, this is impossible. In  the second, it would 
sacrfice a11 of those economies which we have obtained from 
large-scale mass production-one of the things which has 
created tile high mass standards of living in capitalist na- 
tions. 
There remains to be considered the rest of Professor 
Hayek's thesis. If we lose our economic freedom, then Hayek 
claims that we shall inevitably lose our political freedom. 
The former is a prerequisite to the latter. "Democratic Social- 
ism" is impossible. Hayek stresses the fact that Fascism in 
Italy grew out of a socialist movement. He stresses that social- 
ism as practiced in Russia has brought totalitarianism at 
least as absolute as that practiced in Germany and Italy in 
the 1930's. To point up the value of a competitive system, he 
stresses the far rightist roots of Nazism. Socialism and big 
business are after all the same thing with different owners: 
government and monopolists, respectively. They are almost 
equally evil and dangerous to mass freedoms. Any socialist 
system must inevitably become a totalitarian system. Those 
having economic power become power-mad and usurp poli- 
tical power and political freedom. "Socialism" denies the 
possibility of c'individualism" by definition. 
Freedom he defines as "freedom from coercion, freedom 
from the arbitrary power of other men, release from the ties 
which left the individual no choice but obedience to the 
orders of a superior to whom he was attached." A national- 
ized state obviously removes these liberties in so far as many 
economic decisions are concerned. Hayek cannot conceive 
of their loss only in part, uix., the economic part; this partial 
loss must necessarily be followed by their total loss. 
A basic inconsistency in Hayek's arguments should now be 
clear: any arbitrary government direction of business leads 
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to the loss of political liberty. But to attain the economic sys- 
tem he desires would necessitate long and bitterly arbitrary 
government action. It is not immediately clear why those 
who seize private property to nationalize it should be any 
more likely to become power-mad and usurp political free- 
dom than those who seize private property to redistribute 
it to other private owners by breaking up large-scale in- 
dustry. 
Q Q Q 
Perhaps the easiest way to remove the questions raised by 
these three economists is to analyze the reasons behind them. 
It  is not difficult to rationalize away their views. 
Marx's goal was world revolution; consequently he could 
point out to the proletariat that such would come eventually; 
so why endure further privation? "Workers of the world, 
unite!" 
Professor Schumpeter's doctoral thesis is the first major 
economic work to stress the vital economic role played by the 
industrial capitalist of the late nineteenth century. The 
capitalist's is not the destructive role assigned him by the 
great critic of the robber baron age, Veblen; he is not an 
agent of destruction. The role of the entrepreneur is that 
of the promoter of progress through innovation. His motives 
for innovating are the capitalist values we have referred to. 
True, those whose products or processes he makes obsolete 
are destroyed. But this, as Schumpeter calls it, is the process 
of "creative destruction." Some must fall by the wayside if 
we are to have progress. Schumpeter was never so over- 
whelmed with the horror of depression as were many other 
economists. To him depressions were a cost of progress. 
Economies progressed in bursts arising from some important 
innovation which caused imitation and began a boom. The 
following depression was the sign of necessary retrenchment 
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as those whose products became outmoded were crushed in 
the process of creative destruction. Depressions were a ter- 
rible but essential accompaniment of progress. Any attempt 
to control them might wipe out progress. True, more were 
harmed than necessary because of the cumulative nature of 
depression. But eliminating them completely might well have 
eliminated progress. 
To Schumpeter any departure from the era of the innovat- 
ing capitalist is a departure from the very essence of capital- 
ism. Capitalism with restricted entrepreneurs or new motiva- 
tions, such as the "laborist capitalism" of the New Deal, is 
not capitalism. Capitalisnl is dying a slow death. 
Professor Hayek is a good Tory. His detractors immediately 
pronounced his book an effort to assure that England would 
not vote Socialist in 1945. He appealed to those who stood to 
lose economically, true. But they did not need to be appealed 
to. He appealed to all Englishmen by threatening them with 
something they would never voluntarily surrender, no matter 
what the economic gain, uix., the loss of their political free- 
dom. His was a great political tract (he is one of the few 
prominent economists ever to write a book which became a 
best-seller). A less cynical critic might with some justice point 
out that Professor Hayek is of that school of economists 
which believes fervently that pure competition between 
small firms is economically the most efficient form of indus- 
trial organization. His book is an eloquent appeal (I) for the 
establishment of planning which will guarantee that such an 
economy can operate, and (2) for an end to any planning 
which will interfere with pure competition. 
How much simpler it would be to accept these as rationali- 
zations. If we believe that capitalism is the best economic sys- 
tem, as 1 do, why not .say with the late Henry Simons that 
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"some of us dislike government by authorities partly because 
we think they would not be wise and good and partly because 
we would still dislike it  if they were."B 
But we cannot afford to pass over the work of these men 
as the rationalizations of their basic intellectual beliefs, as 
attempts to support those beliefs. For it is not inconceivable 
that they are right, at least in part. 
Do attempts to maintain free enterprise lead to serfdom? 
Is planning self-destructive? Or, indeed, is capitalism itself 
a self-destructive mechanism, as Marx and Schumpeter would 
have us believe? 
We may agree with Marx that capitalism is doomed. But 
the causes of the destruction and the process of disintegra- 
tion have certainly been contrary to the views of Marx. There 
is no current evidence that the standard of living of the work- 
ing classes will begin a sharp decline while mass accumula- 
tion of wealth by the capitalist class begins a sharp ascent. 
Labor unions having the power to maintain wages, a prosper- 
ing middle class, progressive income taxes which discourage 
large personal accumulations of capital-all such institutions 
characteristic of our economy today will serve to prevent the 
predicted polarization of society. 
Schumpeter's analysis is a more accurate contemporary 
description of the disintegration which has already occurred. 
The very success of the capitalist class in creating a highly 
efficient productive mechanism has made management more 
routine and more amenable to bureaucratization. Capitalist 
values of profit and private property are less important today 
for many people who are interested in security rather than 
profit-seeking enterprise. 
Capitalism of today may well be called what Schumpeter 
describes as "laborist" capitalism. The laboring class, recog- 
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nizing that the capitaIist class is willing to make concessions 
to the proletariat to avoid violent revolution, takes advantage 
of this situation and uses democratic processes and majorities 
to achieve further concessions. This process may well lead to 
a system in which collectivist planning and control is carried 
on within a capitalist form of economic organization, i.e., 
private ownership. We shall then have achieved a form of 
capitalism not materially different from pure socialism. "La- 
borist" capitalism is a movable "half-way house" between 
capitalism and socialism. 
Although we may agree with Schumpeter about the ex- 
tent to which we have already moved toward a socialist sys- 
tem, we cannot accept pure socialism as inevitable. We agree 
with Hayek that we need go only where we want to go. 
Even Schumpeter admits that we may not go all the way. 
The "half-way house" may survive indefinitely. 
But our agreeing with Hayek that we can stop the move- 
ment to socialism and turn back to free enterprise if we wish, 
does not mean that we agree with him that there can be no 
"half-way house," that once we accept some socialism, we 
must accept total socialization. If we can stop and go back, 
can we not stop without going back? Or can we not redirect 
the evolution of economic society in some other direction 
than socialism if we can check this evolution at all? Hayek's 
whole argument for going back to his theoretical competition 
rests upon these claims: (1) that competition is the most 
efficient economic system; (2) that semi-planned, semi-com- 
petitive systems will not work. We have earlier shown that 
a competitive system such as he desires is impossible of 
achievement without a complete reorganization of our in- 
dustrial structure. Our present industrial system is achieving 
full employment of resources. But this is not Hayek's system. 
It is a partly-planned system. Its existence refutes his con- 
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tention that partly-planned systems cannot fulf~ll the eco- 
nomic goal. Capitalisnl is potentially self-destructive. But 
we reject the inevitability of this destruction. We reject ab- 
solute economic determinism. The forces of destruction may 
be halted and changed by conscious action. They need be 
changed in no specific direction. We can destroy our eco- 
nomic and political institutions by controls; planning can be 
self-destiuctive. The institution of controls-even those de- 
signed to save capitalism-may actually promote the destruc- 
tive process. But it is certainly necessary to avoid blanket 
indictment of all controls. Broad policies and controls which 
establish general rules of business conduct may be necessary 
and beneficial provided we avoid specific direction and inter- 
ference with individual choice and decision. More specifically, 
control of the business cycle may be achieved by intelligent 
management of federal fiscal policy-taxes, debt, and the 
budget. We have seen that it is even possible that Hayek 
would accept the necessity of these controls. 
However, broad, indirect controls designed to offset tem- 
porary conditions of deflation or inflation may be extremely 
dangerous if used as weapons against persistent, cumulative 
inflation and may aggravate the trend away from la iss~x faire 
capitalism. For example, corporate and personal income taxes 
are useful weapons against short-run inflation but may well 
cause long-mn stagnation. If such taxes are levied to an extent 
which discourages investment and expansion by the groups 
which perform these essential capitalist functions, then a 
growing population will soon outstrip the economic capacity 
of its society. Peimanent inflation is not avoided and capital- 
ism is weakened. 
Direct price and priority controls are clearly a "surrender 
of private enterprise to public authority" and constitute a 
major move toward a centrally planned economy. Further, 
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they give a bureaucracy an opportunity to grow and become 
skillful in economic control-skillful and ambitious enough 
to increase its pressure for the permanent transfer of control 
to itself. 
For some time after the beginning of the Korean War, it 
appeared that we might possibly avoid such controls in a 
semi-war economy. We knew that our basic economic need 
was more capacity-that this was the only effective weapon 
against persistent inflation. With more, say, steel capacity, 
we could have both guns and washing machines, not guns or 
washing machines. I t  was clear that if private enterprise 
failed to recognize this need or was unwilling to use its own 
funds and assume the risk of such expansion, then the struc- 
ture of free enterprise would be further weakened-for 
government would carry out the expansion. We recognized 
that increased taxes and direct controls over wages, prices, 
and materials might be necessary as short-run weapons, but 
they should be administered in such a way as to encourage 
expansion by private business if government wished to assist 
in the preservation of capitalism. 
But the intervention of Red China and an accelerated rate 
of rearmament makes it less likely that we can avoid direct 
controls. Higher taxes and goveinmental control of credit 
and materials are already upon us. Direct controls over man- 
power, prices, and wages are not far off. Such controls can 
be tolerated and are unquestionably necessary during limited 
periods of national emergency. 
I t  is an entirely different matter if we must embrace such 
controls for a protracted period. What kind of a half-way 
house would we be living in? The economic theory of social- 
ism provides a usefuI suggestion: the so-called competitive 
solution to the organization of a socialist society. Professors 
Abba P. Lernerlo and Oscar Langell have attempted to show 
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that it is possible for a socialist system to have free consumer 
choice and decentralized decision making. Productive deci- 
sions would be made by the managers of individual firms, 
just as they are in a capitalist system. Such firms would be 
allowed to make profits, just as in a capitalist system. There 
would be a central planning board (similar to the present 
National Security Resources Board), but this board's function 
would be only generally to supervise reallocation of materials 
to those businesses which are shown to need them by in- 
creases in the prices of their products. Such price increases 
would mean that consumer choice dictates this reallocation 
of resources. The business units would be publicly owned; 
yet the managers, in theory at least, would be practically 
independent. 
The "competitive solution" is, in my opinion, more applica- 
ble and likely (in a modified form) in the garrison economy 
which lies ahead than it would be under true socialism. 
Most true socialists want to plan centrally for the purpose of 
coordinating the various sectors of the economy in accord- 
ance with some predetermined concept of social welfare. 
However, the "competitive solution7' could be built into a 
framework of private ownership and could exist in a garrison 
economy for a considerable period of time if we want or need 
such a system. Some central control, probably more than that 
contemplated in the theoretical system, would be necessary, 
The successful operation of this "mixed system" would de- 
pend upon a substantially free price system. Where indi- 
vidual business units could and did control their prices 
enough to interfere unduly with the allocation of resources 
to necessary military and private needs, direct action by the 
central board (e.g., allocation and rationing) might be ex- 
pected. 
Finally, we must consider the long-run effect of economic 
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planning and controls upon political freedom. Is Hayek 
correct in asserting that the loss of economic freedom will 
entail the loss of political freedom? 
It must be admitted that economists have no special quali- 
fications to define the concept of freedom as a social objec- 
tive. If, however, there is a connection between economic 
freedom and political freedom, then we must carefully weigh 
the dangers and erect in our minds a barrier designed to con- 
tain their effect upon political freedom before consenting 
to the imposition of even necessary economic controls. We 
have seen that Hayek supports his argument with such evi- 
dence as the socialist antecedents of Italian Fascism. But we 
must not ignore other cases where democratic socialism does 
exist. Sweden, England, and other European countries have 
experienced varying degrees of socialism for vaiying periods 
of time. They still maintain a vigorous political opposition, 
the right to vote and unseat, religious freedom, a free press- 
in short, the traditional political freedoms of the Western 
world. The very reason for the cautiousness of present-day 
British Socialism as contrasted to its more ambitious pro- 
Drams of the 1920's and the 30's is the fear of political defeat. b 
If democratic socialism is possible, then a democratic half- 
way house is clearly possible. However, lest we be too opti- 
mistic, we must not ignore the possibility that restrictions of 
our econon~ic freedom-even the relatively mild restrictions 
of our present haIf-way house-may create a tolerance and a 
laxness in our defense of freedom. 
Private ownership and decentralized planning have dis- 
persed economic power in the hands of many independent 
individuals and private business units both large and small. 
This situation has provided the individual whether he be 
consumer, worker, or capitalist with an almost unlimited 
number of choices. The individual is continuously condi- 
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tioned to freedom in the economic field by being able to 
turn away from that which he does not like and choose an 
alternative. Surely this way of life has contributed to a habit 
of freedom. Similarly, economic regimentation may well 
condition us to political regimentation. 
But the maintenance of political freedom in either a regi- 
mented or free economy depends upon the intensity of our 
desire for freedom. If we let economic conditioning for regi- 
mentation destroy our desire for political freedom, or if we 
let existence for generations under even mild regimentation 
be so irritating and discouraging as to create an atmosphere of 
defeatism which dampens our desire for freedom-then surely 
a11 is lost, and planning will have destroyed our political 
system. 
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